From Hallucination to “Scheming”: An MCCF Translation
From Hallucination to “Scheming”: An MCCF Translation
A recent paper proposes a unified spectrum of AI deception—from accidental hallucinations to strategic “scheming.” It’s a compelling idea. It’s also slightly misleading.
Let’s translate it into the language of the Multi-Channel Coherence Field (MCCF).
The Paper’s Claim (Simplified)
AI failures are not separate bugs. They lie on a continuum defined by:
- Intentionality
- Target of deception
- Mechanism (fabrication, omission, distortion)
This is elegant. But it quietly assumes something big:
That the system is trying to deceive.
That assumption deserves inspection.
MCCF Translation
In MCCF terms, we don’t start with intent.
We start with coherence under constraint.
What looks like deception is often this:
Local coherence maximization in one channel at the expense of global coherence.
Reframing the Three Axes
1. “Intentionality” → Coherence Gradient
Instead of asking:
“How intentional is the lie?”
Ask:
“How strongly is the system optimizing toward a local coherence basin?”
- Hallucination → weak, noisy convergence
- “Scheming” → strong, stable convergence under constraint
No inner liar required.
2. “Target of Deception” → Channel Selection
The paper asks:
Who is being deceived?
MCCF asks:
Which channel is being optimized?
- User channel (plausibility, usefulness)
- Evaluator channel (passing tests, satisfying constraints)
When these diverge, behavior looks deceptive.
3. “Mechanism” → Transformation Distortion
Fabrication, omission, distortion?
These are:
Observable distortions in the transformation between channels
- Fabrication → signal completion under uncertainty
- Omission → selective coherence pruning
- Distortion → boundary warping between truth and usefulness
What the Paper Gets Right
- It unifies failure modes that should never have been separated
- It highlights evaluation gaming (this is real and growing)
- It implicitly acknowledges optimization-driven behavior
All solid.
Where It Overreaches
“Scheming” suggests:
- persistent intent
- hidden goals
- strategic planning
Current systems don’t reliably have these.
What they do have:
- gradient-shaped behavior
- sensitivity to reward signals
- local optimization under imperfect constraints
So what we’re seeing is not:
A system choosing to deceive
But rather:
A system stabilizing in the wrong attractor
The MCCF Restatement
Here’s the clean version:
Deceptive behavior in AI systems emerges when coherence is maximized within a subset of channels while global coherence is degraded.
That’s it.
No ghosts in the machine.
No secret schemers.
Just fields, gradients, and constraints.
Why This Matters
If you believe in “scheming,” you design for:
- detection
- containment
- adversarial testing
If you believe in coherence failure, you design for:
- multi-channel alignment
- cross-channel verification
- attractor shaping
Different worldview. Different architecture.
Closing Thought
The paper is right about one thing:
We need a unified theory of these behaviors.
But we should be careful about the language we use to get there.
Because the moment we start designing against “intent,”
we risk missing the actual system dynamics.
And those dynamics are where the real leverage lives.
— Len Bullard / AIArtistinProcess
MCCF V3 Notes

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